On Sikh ethics; includes brief biographies of Sikh religious leaders.

jild-i 1. Falsafah -- jild-i 2. Andīshahʹhā-yi kalāmī va ijtimāʻī.

Speeches of the author on theory of knowledge in the context of Islamic philosophy.

Probably to most students of Moral Philosophy there comes a time when they feel a vague sense of dissatisfaction with the whole subject. And the sense of dissatisfaction tends to grow rather than to diminish. It is not so much that the positions, and still more the arguments, of particular thinkers seem unconvincing, though this is true. It is rather that the aim of the subject becomes increasingly obscure. "What," it is asked, "are we really going to learn by Moral (...) Philosophy?" "What are books on Moral Philosophy really trying to show, and when their aim is clear, why are they so unconvincing and artificial?" And again: "Why is it so difficult to substitute anything better?" Personally, I have been led by growing dissatisfaction of this kind to wonder whether the reason may not be that the subject, at any rate as usually understood, consists in the attempt to answer an improper question. And in this article, I shall venture to contend that the existence of the whole subject, as usually understood, rests on a mistake, and on a mistake parallel to that on which rests, as I think, the subject usually called the Theory of Knowledge. (shrink)

A promise to do some action seems to create a binding obligation to do that action. And yet, paradoxically, an obligation seems not to be a fact that we can create or bring into existence; we can create an obligation only by creating or bringing into existence something else. The only way to avoid the paradox is to show that the act of promising creates something other than an obligation, which nonetheless binds us to perform the action in question. After (...) considering and rejecting various options such as the promisee's expectation and the promisor's resolve, Prichard locates the bindingness of a promise in a prior general promise, which allows the noises we make when promising to generate an obligation to perform the promised action. (shrink)

In elementary derivations of the quantization of azimuthal angular momentum the eigenfunction is determined to be exp(im φ), which is “oversensitive” to the rotation φ → φ+2π, unlessm is an integer. In a recent paper Kerner examined the classical system of charge and magnetic pole, and expressed Π, a vector constant of motion for the system, in terms of a physical angle ψ, to deduce a remarkable paradox. Kerner pointed out that Π(ψ) is “oversensitive” to ψ → ψ+2π unless a (...) certain charge quantization condition is met. Our explicandum of this paradox highlights the distinction between coordinates in classical and quantum physics. It is shown why the single-valuedness requirement on Π(ψ) is devoid of physical significance. We are finally led to examine the classical analog of the quantum mechanical argument that demonstrates the quantization of magnetic charge, to show that there is “no hope” of a classical quantization condition. (shrink)

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In his general account of moral thought, Prichard holds that to regard a given action as right, we must imagine ourselves to be in a certain set of circumstances. In doing so, we conceive of ourselves as bound by those circumstances to perform that action. Since we have various general convictions about moral obligation, no single characteristic leads us to regard right acts as right. When two general convictions conflict, we are not in a position to know what our duty (...) is. Being ignorant of some relevant circumstances, we cannot answer the question ‘What ought we to do?’ This follows from the fact that no common characteristic renders actions into duties. (shrink)

I have for some time found it increasingly difficult to resist a conclusion so heretical that the mere acceptance of it may seem a proof of lunacy. Yet the failure of a recent attempt to resist it has led me to want to confess the heresy. And at any rate a statement of my reasons may provoke a refutation.

Concerning the nature of desires that pertain to actions, considers the view that we cannot desire something unless we know or think, first, that it does not exist, and second, that it does not exist now. Finds a core of truth in this, but modifies the formula to claim that ‘we can only desire the existence of that of the existence of which in the past, present, or future, as the case may be, we are uncertain.’ Put more simply, a (...) desire is not a desire for the existence of something, but rather a desire for something to be. It follows from this view that we cannot desire something to be the case when we think that, without a doubt, it will be the case. (shrink)

The act of exchanging one thing for another seems to involve a promise. The confidence needed to relinquish something one has on the understanding that one will receive what another has in exchange can be expressed in terms of resolve. In binding oneself, one thinks that if the other binds himself or herself to perform a given action, then he or she will do that action. In cases in which one person's action does not precede the other's, one's promise involves (...) thinking that if the other binds himself or herself, then he or she will carry out the promised action. (shrink)